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Abstract
A game-theoretic model for studying power control in multi-carrier CDMA systems is proposed. Power control is modeled as
a non-cooperative game in which each user decides how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its own utility. The
utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted over all the carriers per Joule of energy consumed
and is particularly suitable for networks where energy efficiency is important. The multi-dimensional nature of users’ strategies
and the non-quasiconcavity of the utility function make the multi-carrier problem much more challenging than the single-carrier
or throughput-based-utility case. It is shown that, for all linear receivers including the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the
minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) detector, a user’s utility is maximized when the user transmits only on its “best” carrier. This
is the carrier that requires the least amount of power to achieve a particular target signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
at the output of the receiver. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed power control game are studied.
In particular, conditions are given that must be satisfied by the channel gains for a Nash equilibrium to exist, and the distribution
of the users among the carriers at equilibrium is also characterized. In addition, an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching
the equilibrium (when it exists) is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results in significant improvements in the
total utility achieved at equilibrium compared to a single-carrier system and also to a multi-carrier system in which each user
maximizes its utility over each carrier independently.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Power control is used for resource allocation and interference management in both the uplink and downlink of code division
multiple access (CDMA) systems. In the uplink, the purpose of power control is to allow each user to transmit enough power
so that it can achieve the required quality of service (QoS) at the uplink receiver without causing unnecessary interference to
other users in the system. One of the key issues in wireless system design is energy consumption at users’ terminals. Since
in many scenarios, the users’ terminals are battery-powered, efficient energy management schemes are required in order to
prolong the battery life. Hence, power control plays an even more crucial role in such systems. Recently, game theory has been
used to study power control in data networks and has been shown to be a very effective tool for examining this problem (see
for example [1]–[9]). In [1], the authors provide some motivation for using game theory to study communication systems, and
in particular power control. In [2] and [3], power control is modeled as a non-cooperative game in which users choose their
transmit powers in order to maximize their utilities, where utility is defined as the ratio of throughput to transmit power. In [4],
pricing is introduced to obtain a more efficient solution. Similar approaches are taken in [5]–[8] for different utility functions.
In [9], the authors extend the approach in [2] to study the cross-layer problem of joint multiuser detection and power control.
Multi-carrier CDMA, which combines the benefits of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) with those of
CDMA, is considered to be a potential candidate for next generation high data-rate wireless systems (see [10]). In particular,
in multi-carrier direct-sequence CDMA (DS-CDMA), the data stream for each user is divided into multiple parallel streams.
Each stream is first spread using a spreading sequence and is then transmitted on a carrier [11]. In a single user scenario with
a fixed total transmit power, the optimal power allocation strategy for maximizing the rate is waterfilling over the frequency
channels [12]. The multiuser scenario is more complicated. In [13]–[15], for example, several waterfilling type approaches
have been investigated for multiuser systems to maximize the overall throughput. However, there are many practical situations
where enhancing power efficiency is more important than maximizing throughput. For such applications, it is more important
to maximize the number of bits that can be transmitted per Joule of energy consumed rather than to maximize the throughput.
Consider a multiple-access multi-carrier DS-CDMA network where each user wishes to locally and selfishly choose its
transmit powers over the carriers in such a way as to maximize its own utility. However, the strategy chosen by a user
affects the performance of other users in the network through multiple-access interference. There are several questions to ask
concerning this interaction. First of all, what is a reasonable choice of a utility function that measures energy efficiency in a
multi-carrier network? Secondly, given such a utility function, what strategy should a user choose in order to maximize its
utility? If every user in the network selfishly and locally picks its utility-maximizing strategy, will there be a stable state at
which no user can unilaterally improve its utility (Nash equilibrium)? If such a state exists, will it be unique? What will be
the distribution of users among the carriers at such an equilibrium?
Because of the competitive nature of the users’ interaction, game theory is the natural framework for modeling and studying
such a power control problem. This work is the first game-theoretic treatment of power control in multi-carrier CDMA systems.
We propose a non-cooperative power control game in which each user seeks to choose its transmit power over each carrier to
maximize its overall utility. The utility function here is defined as the ratio of the user’s total throughput to its total transmit
power over all the carriers. This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, measures the total number of reliable bits
transmitted per Joule of energy consumed and is particularly suitable for applications where saving power is critical. Because
of the non-cooperative nature of the proposed game, no coordination among the users is assumed. Compared to prior work on
non-cooperative power control games, there are two difficulties to the problem studied in this paper. One is that users’ strategies
3in the multi-carrier case are vectors (rather than scalars) and this leads to an exponentially larger strategy set for each user
(i.e., many more possibilities). Secondly, the energy efficiency utility function, which is considered here, is non-quasiconcave.
This means that many of the standard theorems from game theory as well as convex optimization cannot be used here. In this
work, we derive the Nash equilibrium [16] for the proposed power control game and study its existence and uniqueness. We
also address the following questions. If there exists a Nash equilibrium for this game, can the users reach the equilibrium in
a distributive manner? What kind of carrier allocations among the competing users will occur at a Nash equilibrium? Will
there be an even spread of usage of the carriers among users? How does the performance of this joint maximization of utility
over all the carriers compare with that of an approach where utility is maximized independently over each carrier? How does
a multi-carrier system compare with a single-carrier system in terms of energy efficiency?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide some background for this work by discussing the
power control game for the single-carrier case. The power control game for multi-carrier systems is presented in Section III.
The Nash equilibrium and its existence for the proposed game are discussed in Sections IV and V, respectively. In particular,
in Section IV, we derive the utility maximizing strategy for a single user when all the other users’ transmit powers are fixed.
In Section V, we show that depending on the channel gains, the proposed power control game may have no equilibrium, a
unique equilibrium, or more than one equilibrium, and we derive conditions that characterize the existence and uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium for a matched filter receiver. The case of two-carrier systems is studied in more detail in Section VI,
where we obtain explicit expressions for the probabilities corresponding to occurrence of various possible Nash equilibria. In
Section VII, we present an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the Nash equilibrium (when it exists). Numerical
results are presented in Section VIII. We show that at Nash equilibrium, with a high probability, the users are evenly distributed
among the carriers. We also demonstrate that our proposed method of jointly maximizing the utility over all the carriers provides
a significant improvement in performance compared with a single-carrier system as well the multi-carrier case in which each
user simply optimizes over each carrier independently. Finally, conclusions are given in Section IX.
II. POWER CONTROL GAMES IN SINGLE-CARRIER NETWORKS
Let us first look at the power control game with a single carrier. To pose the power control problem as a non-cooperative
game, we first need to define a utility function suitable for data applications. Most data applications are sensitive to error but
tolerant to delay. It is clear that a higher signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) level at the output of the receiver will
generally result in a lower bit error rate and hence higher throughput. However, achieving a high SINR level requires the user
terminal to transmit at a high power, which in turn results in low battery life. This tradeoff can be quantified (as in [2]) by
defining the utility function of a user to be the ratio of its throughput to its transmit power, i.e.,
uk =
Tk
pk
. (1)
Throughput is the net number of information bits that are transmitted without error per unit time (sometimes referred to as
goodput). It can be expressed as
Tk =
L
M
Rkf(γk), (2)
where L and M are the number of information bits and the total number of bits in a packet, respectively; Rk and γk are
the transmission rate and the SINR for the kth user, respectively; and f(γk) is the efficiency function representing the packet
success rate (PSR), i.e., the probability that a packet is received without an error. Our assumption is that if a packet has one or
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Fig. 1. A typical efficiency function (single-carrier case) representing the packet success probability as a function of received SINR.
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Fig. 2. User’s utility as a function of transmit power for fixed interference (single-carrier case).
more bit errors, it will be retransmitted. The efficiency function, f(·), is assumed to be increasing, continuous, and S-shaped1
(sigmoidal) with f(∞) = 1. We also require that f(0) = 0 to ensure that uk = 0 when pk = 0. These assumptions are valid
in many practical systems. An example of a sigmoidal efficiency function is given in Fig. 1. Using a sigmoidal efficiency
function, the shape of the utility function in (1) is shown in Fig. 2 as a function of the user’s transmit power keeping other
users’ transmit powers fixed. It should be noted that the throughput Tk in (2) could be replaced with any increasing concave
function as long as we make sure that uk = 0 when pk = 0. A more detailed discussion of the efficiency function can be
found in [9]. It can be shown that for a sigmoidal efficiency function, the utility function in (1) is a quasiconcave2 function
of the user’s transmit power [17]. This is also true if the throughput in (2) is replaced with an increasing concave function of
γk.
1An increasing function is S-shaped if there is a point above which the function is concave, and below which the function is convex.
2The function f defined on a convex set S is quasiconcave if every superlevel set of f is convex, i.e., {x ∈ S|f(x) ≥ a} is convex for every value of a.
5Based on (1) and (2), the utility function for user k can be written as
uk =
(
L
M
Rk
)
f(γk)
pk
. (3)
This utility function, which has units of bits/Joule, captures very well the tradeoff between throughput and battery life and is
particularly suitable for applications where saving power is crucial.
Power control is modeled as a non-cooperative game in which each user tries to selfishly maximize its own utility. It is
shown in [4] that, in a single-carrier system, when matched filters are used as the uplink receivers, if user terminals are allowed
to choose only their transmit powers for maximizing their utilities, then there exists an equilibrium point at which no user
can improve its utility given the power levels of other users (Nash equilibrium). This equilibrium is achieved when the users’
transmit powers are SINR-balanced with the output SINR being equal to γ∗, the solution to f(γ) = γ f ′(γ). Furthermore, this
equilibrium is unique. In [9], this analysis is extended to other linear receivers.
In this work, we extend this game-theoretic approach to multi-carrier systems. In the multi-carrier case, each user’s strategy
is a vector (rather than a scalar). Furthermore, the utility function is not a quasiconcave function of the user’s strategy. Hence,
the problem is much more challenging than the one in the single-carrier scenario.
III. THE NON-COOPERATIVE POWER CONTROL GAME IN MULTI-CARRIER SYSTEMS
Let us consider the uplink of a synchronous multi-carrier DS-CDMA data network with K users, D carriers and processing
gain N (for each carrier). The carriers are assumed to be sufficiently far apart so that the (spread-spectrum) signal transmitted
over each carrier does not interfere with the signals transmitted over other carriers [11]. We also assume that the delay spread
and Doppler spread are negligible for each individual carrier. At the transmitter, the incoming bits for user k are divided into
D parallel streams and each stream is spread using the spreading code of user k. The D parallel streams are then sent over
the D (orthogonal) carriers. For the ℓth carrier, the received signal at the uplink receiver (after chip-matched filtering and
sampling) can be represented by an N × 1 vector as
rℓ =
K∑
k=1
√
pkℓhkℓ bkℓ sk +wℓ (4)
where bkℓ, pkℓ, hkℓ are the kth user’s transmitted bit, transmit power and path gain, respectively, for the ℓth frequency channel
(carrier); sk is the spreading sequence for user k which is assumed to be random with unit norm; and wℓ is the noise vector
which is assumed to be Gaussian with mean 0 and covariance σ2I. Let us express the channel gain as
hkℓ =
c
dνk
a2kℓ, (5)
where dk is the distance of user k from the uplink receiver and akℓ is a Rayleigh random variable representing the small scale
channel fading. Here, c and ν are constants which determine the path loss as a function of distance.
We propose a non-cooperative game in which each user chooses its transmit powers over the D carriers to maximize
its overall utility. In other words, each user (selfishly) decides how much power to transmit over each frequency channel
(carrier) to achieve the highest overall utility. Let GD = [K, {AMCk }, {uMCk }] denote the proposed non-cooperative game
where K = {1, · · · ,K}, and AMCk = [0, Pmax]D is the strategy set for the kth user. Here, Pmax is the maximum transmit
power on each carrier. Each strategy in AMCk can be written as pk = [pk1, · · · , pkD]. The utility function for user k is defined
as the ratio of the total throughput to the total transmit power for the D carriers, i.e.,
uMCk =
∑D
ℓ=1 Tkℓ∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
, (6)
6where Tkℓ is the throughput achieved by user k over the ℓth carrier, and is given by Tkℓ = LMRkf(γkℓ) with γkℓ denoting
the received SINR for user k on carrier ℓ. Hence, the resulting non-cooperative game can be expressed as the following
maximization problem:
max
pk
uMCk = max
pk1,··· ,pkD
uMCk for k = 1, · · · ,K, (7)
under the constraint of non-negative powers (i.e., pkℓ ≥ 0 for all k = 1, · · · ,K and ℓ = 1, · · · , D). Without significant loss of
generality, if we assume equal transmission rates for all users, (7) can be expressed as
max
pk1,··· ,pkD
∑D
ℓ=1 f(γkℓ)∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
for k = 1, · · · ,K. (8)
The relationship between the γkℓ’s and the pkℓ’s is dependent on the uplink receiver.
It should be noted that the assumption of equal transmission rates for all users can be made less restrictive. For our analysis,
it is sufficient for the users to have equal transmission rates over different carriers but the transmission rate can be different
for different users. More generally, the proposed power control game can be extended to allow the users to pick not only
their transmit powers but also their transmission rates over the D carriers. While joint power and rate control is important,
particularly for data applications, our focus throughout this work is on power control only. We will briefly comment on the
joint power and rate control problem at the end of Section IV.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE PROPOSED GAME
For the non-cooperative power control game proposed in the previous section, a Nash equilibrium is a set of power vectors,
p∗1, ...,p
∗
K , such that no user can unilaterally improve its utility by choosing a different power vector, i.e., p∗1, · · · ,p∗K is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if
uMCk (p
∗
k,P
∗
−k) ≥ u
MC
k (pk,P
∗
−k) for all pk, (9)
and for k = 1, · · · ,K . Here, P∗−k denotes the set of transmit power vectors of all the users except for user k.
We begin by characterizing utility maximization by a single user when other users’ transmit powers are fixed.
Proposition 1: For all linear receivers and with all other users’ transmit powers being fixed, user k’s utility function, given
by (6), is maximized when
pkℓ =

 p
∗
kLk
for ℓ = Lk
0 for ℓ 6= Lk
, (10)
where Lk = argminℓ p∗kℓ with p∗kℓ being the transmit power required by user k to achieve an output SINR equal to γ∗ on the
ℓth carrier, or Pmax if γ∗ cannot be achieved. Here, γ∗ is the unique (positive) solution of f(γ) = γ f ′(γ).
Proof : We first show that f(γ)
p
is maximized when p is such that γ = γ∗. For this, we take the derivative of f(γ)
p
with
respect to p and equate it to zero to obtain
p
∂γ
∂p
f ′(γ)− f(γ) = 0. (11)
Since for all linear receivers p∂γ
∂p
= γ [9], f(γ)
p
is maximized when γ = γ∗, the (positive) solution to f(γ) = γf ′(γ). It
is shown in [17] that for an S-shaped function, γ∗ exists and is unique. If γ∗ cannot be achieved, f(γ)
p
is maximized when
p = Pmax. Now, define p∗kℓ as the transmit power required by user k to achieve an output SINR equal to γ∗ on the ℓth carrier
(or Pmax if γ∗ is not achievable) and let Lk = argminℓ p∗kℓ. In case of ties, we can pick any of the indices corresponding
7to the minimum power. Then, based on the above argument we have f(γkLk )
pkLk
≤ f(γ
∗)
p∗
kLk
for any pkLk ≥ 0. Also, because
p∗kLk = minℓ p
∗
kℓ, we have
f(γkℓ)
pkℓ
≤ f(γ
∗)
p∗
kℓ
≤ f(γ
∗)
p∗
kLk
for all pkℓ ≥ 0 and ℓ 6= Lk. Based on the above inequalities, we can write
f(γkℓ)
f(γ∗)
≤
pkℓ
p∗kLk
, for ℓ = 1, 2, · · · , D. (12)
Adding the D inequalities given in (12) and rewriting the resulting inequality, we have∑D
ℓ=1 f(γkℓ)∑D
ℓ=1 pkℓ
≤
f(γ∗)
p∗kLk
for all pk1, · · · , pkD ≥ 0 . (13)
This completes the proof. ✷
Proposition 1 suggests that the utility for user k is maximized when the user transmits only over its “best” carrier such that
the achieved SINR at the output of the uplink receiver is equal to γ∗. The “best” carrier is the one that requires the least amount
of transmit power to achieve γ∗ at the output of the uplink receiver. Based on Proposition 1, at a Nash equilibrium each user
transmits only on one carrier. This significantly reduces the number of cases that need to be considered as possible candidates
for a Nash equilibrium. A set of power vectors, p∗1, · · · ,p∗K , is a Nash equilibrium if and only if they simultaneously satisfy
(10).
It should also be noted that the utility-maximizing strategy suggested by Proposition 1 is different from the waterfilling
approach that is discussed in [18] for digital subscriber line (DSL). This is because in [18], utility is defined as the user’s
throughput and the goal there is to maximize this utility function for a fixed amount of available power. Here, on the other
hand, the amount of available power is not fixed. In addition, utility is defined here as the number of bits transmitted per Joule
of energy consumed which is particularly suitable for systems with energy constraints.
Alternatively, user k’s utility function can be defined as u˜k =
∑D
ℓ=1
Tkℓ
pkℓ
. This utility function is maximized when each of
the terms in the summation is maximized. This happens when the user transmits on all the carriers at power levels that achieve
γ∗ for every carrier. This is equivalent to the case in which each user maximizes its utility over each carrier independently. We
show in Section VIII that our proposed joint maximization approach, through performing a distributed interference avoidance
mechanism, significantly outperforms the approach of individual utility maximization. Throughout this paper, the expression
in (6) is used for the user’s utility function.
Since at Nash equilibrium (when it exists), each user must transmit on one carrier only, there are exactly DK possibilities
for an equilibrium. For example, in the case of K = D = 2, there are four possibilities for Nash equilibrium:
• User 1 and user 2 both transmit on the first carrier.
• User 1 and user 2 both transmit on the second carrier.
• User 1 transmits on the first carrier and user 2 transmits on the second carrier.
• User 1 transmits on the second carrier and user 2 transmits on the first carrier.
Depending on the set of channel gains, i.e., the hkℓ’s, the proposed power control game may have no equilibrium, a unique
equilibrium, or more than one equilibrium. In the following, we investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
for the conventional matched filter receiver and also comment on the extensions of the results to other linear multiuser receivers
such as the decorrelating and minimum mean square error (MMSE) detectors [19] [20].
For the joint power and rate control problem, it can be shown by using a similar technique as the one used in the proof
of Proposition 1 that for each user to maximize its own utility, the user must transmit only on its “best” carrier. Furthermore,
the combined choice of power and rate has to be such that the output SINR is equal to γ∗. This implies that there are infinite
combinations of power and rate that maximize the user’s utility given that the powers and rates of other users are fixed.
8V. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM
If we assume random spreading sequences, the output SINR for the ℓth carrier of the kth user with a matched filter receiver
is given by
γkℓ =
pkℓhkℓ
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjℓhjℓ
. (14)
Let us define
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
σ2 + 1
N
∑
j 6=k pjℓhjℓ
(15)
as the “effective channel gain” for user k over the ℓth carrier. Based on (14) and (15), we have γkℓ = hˆkℓpkℓ.
Let us for now assume that the processing gain is sufficiently large so that even when all K users transmit on the same
carrier, γ∗ can be achieved by all users. This is the case when N > (K − 1)γ∗. We later relax this assumption. The following
proposition helps identify the Nash equilibrium (when it exists) for a given set of channel gains.
Proposition 2: For a matched filter receiver, a necessary condition for user k to transmit on the ℓth carrier at equilibrium
is that
hkℓ
hki
>
Θn(ℓ)
Θn(i)
Θ0 for all i 6= ℓ , (16)
where n(i) is the number of users transmitting on the ith carrier and
Θn =
1
1− (n− 1)γ
∗
N
n = 0, 1, · · · ,K. (17)
In this case, p∗kℓ =
γ∗σ2
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ).
Proof : Based on Proposition 1, in order for user k to transmit on carrier ℓ at equilibrium, we must have
hˆkℓ > hˆki for all i 6= ℓ. (18)
Since n(ℓ) users (including user k) are transmitting on the ℓth carrier and n(i) users are transmitting on the ith carrier and
all users have an output SINR equal to γ∗, we have
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
σ2 + n(ℓ)−1
N
qℓ
, (19)
and
hˆki =
hki
σ2 + n(i)
N
qi
, (20)
where qℓ = σ
2γ∗
1− (n(ℓ)−1)γ
∗
N
and qi = σ
2γ∗
1− (n(i)−1)γ
∗
N
are the received powers for each user on the ℓth and ith carriers, respectively.
Now define Θn = 1
1−(n−1) γ
∗
N
to get qℓ = σ2γ∗Θn(ℓ) and qi = σ2γ∗Θn(i). Substituting qℓ and qi into (19) and (20) and taking
advantage of the fact that 1 + (n−1)γ
∗
N
Θn = Θn, we get
hˆkℓ =
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ)σ2
, (21)
and
hˆki =
hki
Θn(i)
Θ0
σ2
. (22)
Consequently, (16) is obtained by substituting (21) and (22) into (18). Furthermore, since p∗kℓhkℓ = qℓ = σ2γ∗Θn(ℓ), we have
p∗kℓ =
γ∗σ2
hkℓ
Θn(ℓ), and this completes the proof. ✷
Note that, based on (17), when N > (K − 1)γ∗, we have 0 < Θ0 < Θ1 < Θ2 < · · · < ΘK with Θ1 = 1.
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Fig. 3. Nash equilibrium regions for the case of two users and two carriers. (1,2), for example, means that at equilibrium user 1 transmits on the first carrier
and user 2 transmits on the second carrier.
For each of the DK possible equilibria, the channel gains for each user must satisfy D − 1 inequalities similar to (16).
Furthermore, satisfying a set of K(D− 1) of such inequalities by the K users is sufficient for existence of Nash equilibrium
but the uniqueness is not guaranteed. For example, for the case of K = D = 2, the four possible equilibria can be characterized
as follows.
• For both users to transmit on the first carrier at equilibrium, we must have h11
h12
> Θ2 and h21h22 > Θ2.
• For both users to transmit on the second carrier at equilibrium, we must have h11
h12
< 1Θ2 and
h21
h22
< 1Θ2 .
• For user 1 and user 2 to transmit on the first and second carriers, respectively, at equilibrium, we must have h11
h12
> Θ0
and h21
h22
< 1Θ0 .
• For user 1 and user 2 to transmit on the second and first carriers, respectively, at equilibrium, we must have h11
h12
< 1Θ0
and h21
h22
> Θ0.
Fig. 3 shows the regions corresponding to the above four equilibria. It can be seen that for certain values of channel gains
there is no Nash equilibrium (the white areas in the figure) and for some values of channel gains there are two possible
equilibria. When the channel gains belong to the white regions, none of the four possible candidates for Nash equilibrium is
stable. It can be shown that if we put the two users in any of these four possible states, at least one of the users would prefer
to jump to the other carrier because that would improve its utility. Hence, no Nash equilibrium exists.
It is interesting to observe that homogeneity of channel gains can prevent Nash equilibrium from existing. Consider the
two-user two-carrier case where h12 = h21, it is easy to verify the following:
Corollary 1: If either h11/h22 or h22/h11 belongs to [1/Θ22,Θ20], then there does not exist a Nash equilibrium.
When the processing gain is less than or equal to (K − 1)γ∗, it is not possible for all users to transmit on the same carrier
and achieve γ∗ simultaneously. Instead, they would end up transmitting at the maximum power (see Proposition 1). More
specifically, for any given N ≤ (K − 1)γ∗, at most ⌊N/γ∗ − 1⌋ users can simultaneously achieve γ∗ on the same carrier.
Therefore, as N decreases, those Nash equilibria in which the distribution of users among the carriers is less uniform are less
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likely to occur. This means that for small values of processing gain, the distribution of users among the carriers becomes more
uniform. However, the probability that no Nash equilibrium exists increases. We will discuss this further in Section VI.
Similar analysis can be done for the decorrelating and MMSE detectors. However, because of the dependence of the SINR
expressions of these receivers on the spreading sequences of all the users, obtaining closed form expressions such as the ones
given in (16) and (17) is not possible.
VI. SPECIAL CASE OF TWO CARRIERS
To gain some insight into the properties of the Nash equilibria for our proposed game, let us concentrate on a system with
two carriers and two users (i.e., D = K = 2). We assume that the akℓ’s in (5) are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) among the users and carriers and have the Rayleigh distribution with mean 1. As a result, the a2kℓ’s will be i.i.d. with
the exponential distribution of mean 1. Let X1 be the random variable corresponding to the number of users that transmit over
the first carrier at equilibrium. Also let PX1(m) represent the probability that there are m users on the first carrier at Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 3: If N > γ∗, then the probabilities that there are zero, one, and two users transmitting on the first carrier at
Nash equilibrium are, respectively, given by
PX1(0) =
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
(23)
PX1(1) = 2
(
1
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
(24)
PX1(2) =
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
. (25)
Proof : If we assume N > γ∗, then, based on Proposition 2, the probability that both users transmit on the first carrier at
equilibrium (i.e., X1 = 2) is given by (see Fig. 3)
PX1 (2) = Pr{X1 = 2} = Pr
{
h11
h12
> Θ2,
h21
h22
> Θ2
}
= Pr
{
a211
a212
> Θ2
}
Pr
{
a221
a222
> Θ2
}
=

 ∫ ∫
{(u,v):u≥0,v≥0 and u
v
>Θ2}
e−(u+v)du dv


2
=
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
.
Similarly, the probability of both users transmitting on the second carrier at equilibrium is
PX1 (0) = Pr{X1 = 0} = Pr
{
h12
h11
> Θ2,
h22
h21
> Θ2
}
=
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2
.
The probability of one user transmitting on each of the two carriers can be found to be
PX1(1) = Pr{X1 = 1} = Pr
{
h11
h12
> Θ0,
h21
h22
<
1
Θ0
}
+ Pr
{
h11
h12
<
1
Θ0
,
h21
h22
> Θ0
}
−Pr
{
Θ0 <
h11
h12
<
1
Θ0
,Θ0 <
h21
h22
<
1
Θ0
}
= 2
(
1
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
.
This completes the proof. ✷
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Based on (23)–(25), the probability that no Nash equilibrium exists is given by
Po = Pr{No Nash equilibrium} = 2
{(
Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1
1 + Θ2
)2}
. (26)
It should be noted that since Po > 0, the PX1(m)’s, in general, do not add up to 1. Therefore, they represent a pseudo
probability mass function (pseudo PMF) for X1. As the processing gain N becomes larger, Θ0 and Θ2 approach 1 from
below and above, respectively. This results in a reduction in PX1(1) but an increase in PX1(0) and PX1(2), i.e., the pseudo
PMF for X1 becomes flatter. However, the increase outweighs the decrease and as a result Po decreases as N increases.
Going back to Fig. 3, we see that the region for which no Nash equilibrium exists shrinks as N increases. In addition, the
region for which more than one equilibrium exists disappears as N becomes very large. Therefore, as the processing gain
becomes large, the probability that the proposed power control game has a unique Nash equilibrium approaches one. Note that
as N → ∞, we have Θ0 → 1 and Θ2 → 1. Therefore, based on (23)–(27), in the limit of large processing gains, we have
PX1(0) = PX1(2) =
1
4 , PX1(1) =
1
2 and Po = 0. This is because for a sufficiently large processing gain, the multiple-access
interference becomes insignificant compared to the background noise. Therefore, each user transmits on the carrier with the
best channel gain. This means that the probability that user 1 transmits on the first carrier becomes independent of whether
the other user is transmitting on the first or second carrier (and vice versa).
So far, the assumption has been that N > γ∗ so that both users can achieve γ∗ even when they are transmitting over the
same carrier.
Proposition 4: If N ≤ γ∗, then the probabilities that there are zero, one, and two users transmitting on the first carrier at
Nash equilibrium are, respectively, given by
PX1(0) ≈ 0 (27)
PX1(1) = 2
(
1
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
(28)
PX1(2) ≈ 0 . (29)
Proof : If N ≤ γ∗, the users cannot achieve γ∗ simultaneously when they are transmitting on the same carrier and they
would end up transmitting at the maximum power. Hence,
PX1(2) = Pr{X1 = 2} = Pr{Pmax < p
∗
12 and Pmax < p∗22},
where p∗12 =
σ2γ∗
h12
and p∗22 = σ
2γ∗
h22
. Therefore,
PX1(2) = Pr
{
h12 <
σ2γ∗
Pmax
and h22 <
σ2γ∗
Pmax
}
= Pr
{
h12 <
σ2γ∗
Pmax
}
Pr
{
h122 <
σ2γ∗
Pmax
}
,
assuming independent channel gains.
Now based on (5), we have
PX1(2) = Pr
{
a212 <
dν1σ
2γ∗
cPmax
}
Pr
{
a222 <
dν2σ
2γ∗
cPmax
}
If the channel amplitudes have a Rayleigh distribution, then a2kℓ’s have an exponential distribution with mean 1. Therefore,
Pr
{
a2kℓ <
dνkσ
2γ∗
cPmax
}
= 1− e−bkℓ
where bkℓ = d
ν
kσ
2γ∗
cPmax
.
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For typical values of c, d, ν, σ2 and Pmax, b is very small. For example, for c = 0.1, d = 100m , ν = 4, σ2 = 10−16W ,
γ∗ = 6.4, and Pmax = 1W, we get b = 6.4× 10−7. As a result, 1− e−b ≃ b. Therefore, PX1 (2) ∼= b12b22 ≈ 0. Similarly, we
have PX1(0) ∼= b11b21 ≈ 0.
To obtain PX1(1), we can follow the same steps as the ones used for the case of N > γ∗. Hence, when N ≤ γ∗, we have
PX1(1) = 2
(
1
1+Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1+Θ0
)2
.
This complete the proof. ✷
Based on (27)–(29), we have Po = 1−
[
2
(
1
1+Θ0
)2
−
(
1−Θ0
1+Θ0
)2]
= 2
(
Θ0
1+Θ0
)2
when N ≤ γ∗.
We can summarize Propositions 3 and 4 as
PX1(0) = PX1 (2) =


0 if N ≤ γ∗(
1
1+Θ2
)2
if N > γ∗
, (30)
PX1 (1) = 2
(
1
1 + Θ0
)2
−
(
1− Θ0
1 + Θ0
)2
, (31)
and
Po =


2
(
Θ0
1+Θ0
)2
if N ≤ γ∗
2
[(
Θ0
1+Θ0
)2
−
(
1
1+Θ2
)2]
if N > γ∗
. (32)
Although obtaining explicit expressions for the probabilities of the occurrence of various Nash equilibria for the case in
which K > 2 is more complicated, many of the general trends observed for the K = 2 case are also valid when K > 2.
Namely, as N increases the pseudo PMF of X1 becomes wider (i.e., it has larger variance) and at the same time the probability
that no equilibrium exists becomes smaller. This means that in the asymptotic case of large processing gains, the proposed
power control game has a unique equilibrium. Furthermore, for very large values of N , the PMF of X1 can be approximated
as
PX1(m) = Pr{X1 = m} ≈

 K
m

(1
2
)K
for m = 0, · · · ,K. (33)
Similar arguments can be made for the decorrelating and MMSE detectors. In particular, since these receivers are more
powerful in combating interference, for the same processing gain, the pseudo PMF of X1 is wider as compared to the one
for the matched filter. Also, since multiuser receivers suppress multiple-access interference more effectively, the probability
of presence of a particular user on a certain carrier is almost independent of where the other users are transmitting. This is
particularly true for large processing gains. Therefore, the approximation in (33) is more accurate for the decorrelating and
MMSE detectors as compared to the conventional matched filter receiver.
The validity of these claims will also be confirmed through simulations in Section VIII.
VII. A DISTRIBUTED POWER CONTROL ALGORITHM
In this section, we present an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching a Nash equilibrium of the proposed power
control game (when it exists). This algorithm is applicable to all linear receivers including the matched filter, decorrelating
and MMSE detectors. The description of the algorithm is as follows.
The Best-response Multi-carrier Power-control (BMP) Algorithm: Consider a network with K users and D carriers.
1) Initialize the transmit powers of all the users over all the carriers, and let NumIter = 0.
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2) Set k = 1, and NumIter = NumIter + 1.
3) Given the transmit powers of other users, user k picks its “best” carrier and transmits only on this carrier at a power
level that achieves an output SINR equal to γ∗. The “best” carrier is the one that requires the least amount of transmit
power for achieving γ∗.
4) k = k + 1.
5) If k ≤ K then go back to step 3.
6) Stop if the powers have converged or if NumIter > MaxNumIter; otherwise go to step 2.
This is a best-response algorithm since at each stage, a user decides to transmit on the carrier that maximizes the user’s
utility (i.e., its best-response strategy) given the current conditions of the system. In Step 3, it may appear that each user needs
to know not only its own transmit powers and channel gains but also those for all the other users in order to determine its
“best” carrier. However, it should be noted that it is actually sufficient for the user to only know its own received SINRs on
each carrier. This information can for example be fed back to the user terminal from the access point.
It is clear that if the above algorithm converges, it will converge to a Nash equilibrium. The question that remains to be
answered is whether or not the above algorithm converges whenever a Nash equilibrium exists. In Appendix I, we have proved
that for the two-user two-carrier case, the BMP algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium when it exists. Using a similar
technique, we have also proved the convergence for the case of two users and D carriers as well as for the three-user two-carrier
case (see Appendices II and III). We have shown that for each of the possible Nash equilibria, starting from any state, the
algorithm will eventually reach the equilibrium state. Since the general case of K users and D carriers is not fundamentally
different from the ones considered here, the same technique can be used to prove the convergence of the BMP algorithm
for the general case of K users and D carriers except that there are many more possibilities to consider in the proof. The
convergence of the BMP algorithm has also been demonstrated in Section VIII using extensive simulations. In the case of
multiple Nash equilibria, the algorithm converges to one of the equilibria depending on the starting point. For the scenarios
where no Nash equilibrium exists, users keep jumping from one carrier to another one when the BMP algorithm is used.
However, the algorithm stops when the number of iterations reaches MaxNumIter. The value of MaxNumIter should be chosen
large enough to ensure the convergence of the powers for the cases where an equilibrium exists.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We first consider the case of two carriers with two users. We assume L = M = 100, R = 100Kbps and σ2 = 5×10−16Watts;
and use f(γ) = (1− e−γ)M as the efficiency function3. For this efficiency function, γ∗ = 6.4 (=8.1dB). We assume that the
channel gains are i.i.d. with exponential distribution of mean 1. We consider 20 000 realizations of the channel gains. For each
realization, we run the BMP algorithm, proposed in Section VII, for 20 iterations (i.e., MaxNumIter=20). If convergence is
reached by the end of the 20th iteration, we record the number of users that transmit on each carrier; otherwise, we assume
there is no equilibrium. For our simulations, Pmax is assumed to be very large which translates to having no transmit power
limit for the user terminals.
It is observed that the BMP algorithm proposed in Section VII converges whenever a Nash equilibrium exists. Recall that
PX1(m) represents the probability that exactly m users transmit on the first carrier at equilibrium. Fig. 4 shows PX1(2), PX1(1)
and Po (probability of no equilibrium) as a function of the processing gain N for the matched filter. The analytical expressions
3This is a useful example for the efficiency function and serves as an approximation to the packet success rate that is very reasonable for almost all practical
cases with moderate to large values of M .
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Fig. 4. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at equilibrium, PX1(m), for m = 1, 2 as well as probability of having no equilibrium are shown
as functions of the processing gain N for the matched filter for the two-user two-carrier case (i.e., D = 2 and K = 2).
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Fig. 5. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at equilibrium, PX1(m), for m = 1, 2 as well as probability of having no equilibrium are shown as
functions of the processing gain N for the matched filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE) and the MMSE detector for the two-user two-carrier case (i.e., D = 2
and K = 2).
obtained in Section VI (see (30)–(32)) are also plotted. We see that there is a close agreement between the simulation results
and the analytical values. It is also observed that as N becomes large, Po approaches zero. For N = 16, for example, the
probability that a Nash equilibrium exists is about 93%. Since PX1(0) is identical to PX1(2), it is not shown in the figure.
For comparison, we have shown the probabilities for the matched filter, the decorrelator and the MMSE detector in Fig. 5. It
should be noted that Po for the decorrelator is always 0 (as long as N ≥ K) and Po is almost always zero for the MMSE
detector (except for low values of N ). This means that for these two receivers a Nash equilibrium almost always exists.
Fig. 6 shows PX1 (m) as a function of m for different values of N . The results are shown for the matched filter, the
decorrelator and the MMSE receiver. We can see from the figure that as the processing gain increases, the pseudo PMF of
X1 becomes wider (i.e., it has a larger variance). This is because for larger values of N , the system becomes more tolerant
towards interference. Therefore, the probability with which the two users are able to transmit on the same carrier at equilibrium
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Fig. 6. The (pseudo) probability mass function of X1 for different values of processing gain N for the two-user two-carrier case (i.e., D = 2 and K = 2)
for the matched filter (MF), the decorrelator (DE), and the MMSE detector. X1 is a random variable representing the number of users transmitting on the
first carrier at Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 7. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at equilibrium, PX1 (m), for m = 5, 6, · · · , 10 as well as probability of having no equilibrium
are shown as functions of the processing gain N for the matched filter for the ten-user two-carrier case (i.e., D = 2 and K = 10).
increases. Since the decorrelating and MMSE detectors are more effective in suppressing interference, for the same processing
gain, the corresponding PMF’s are wider than that of the matched filter. We repeat the above experiment for the case of two
carriers and 10 users. Fig. 7 shows PX1(m) for the matched filter as a function of the processing gain. Due to symmetry, we
have only plotted the probabilities for m = 5, 6, · · · , 10. The probability that no equilibrium exists (i.e., Po) is also shown.
Similar trends as those observed in the case of K = 2 are also seen here. We observe that here again as N becomes large, Po
approaches zero. It should be noted that when N is small, γ∗ cannot be achieved simultaneously by all the users at the output
of the matched filters. Therefore, users keep increasing their transmit powers and hence no equilibrium is reached. This is the
case until N becomes large enough so that it can accommodate at least 5 users on each carrier (i.e., N > 25.6). In practice,
however, if N is not large enough, some or all users end up transmitting at the maximum power.
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In Fig. 8, PX1(m) is plotted as a function of m for the matched filter as well as the decorrelating and MMSE detectors for
different values of N . The asymptotic approximation for PX1(m), given by (33), is also shown. We see from the figure that as
the processing gain increases, the pseudo PMF of X1 becomes wider because the system becomes more interference-tolerant.
Also, the equilibria for which the allocation of users to the carriers is highly asymmetric (e.g., m = 9 and 10) are unlikely
to happen. In other words, with a high probability, the users are evenly distributed between the two carriers. As expected,
the pseudo PMF’s of the decorrelator and the MMSE detector are wider than those of the matched filer and are more closely
approximated by (33), especially as N becomes large. Based on the pseudo PMF’s of X1, we have plotted the standard deviation
of X1 for the matched filter, the decorrelator and the MMSE detector as a function of N (see Fig. 9). It is observed that the
standard deviation of X1 increases as the processing gain increases and the values are higher for the multiuser detectors as
compared to those of the matched filter. This means that it is more likely for the decorrelator and the MMSE detector to have
a more non-uniform distribution of users over the carriers at equilibrium. This, of course, makes sense because the multiuser
detectors are more powerful in combating the multiple-access interference as compared to the matched filter.
We now investigate the effect of the number of carriers on the energy efficiency of the system. For a fixed bandwidth, as
the number of carriers, D, increases, the number of independent channels for each user increases. Hence, the quality of the
“best” channel for each user improves. On the other hand, since the bandwidth is fixed, the processing gain for each carrier
decreases as the number of carriers increases. Let us consider a system with 30 users (K = 30). We fix the bandwidth and
change the number of carriers from 1 (i.e., single carrier) to 15. The processing gain for the case of D = 1 is assumed to
be 256. For each value of D, we run the BMP algorithm for 20 iterations and compute the total utility of the system at the
end of the 20th iteration. We repeat this for 20 000 channel realizations and average the results. Fig. 10 shows the average
total utility vs. number of carriers. It is observed from the figure that as the number of carriers increases, the total utility also
increases. We might have expected the utility to decrease after a certain point because of the reduction in the processing gain.
However, a smaller processing gain results in a more even distribution of users among the carrier. To demonstrate this, Fig. 11
shows the PX1(m) as a function of m for two-carrier case with N = 128. This plot is obtained by counting the number of
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Fig. 10. Total utility vs. number of carriers, D, with 30 users for a fixed bandwidth. The processing gain is 256 when D = 1 and decreasing proportionally
as D increases (i.e., N = 256
D
).
users on each carrier at the end of the 20th iteration of the algorithm. It is seen that most of the time the users are equally
distributed between the two carriers. Similarly, we can say that with D carriers, most of the time, we will have K/D users
transmitting on each carrier. Therefore, the system does not suffer from excessive interference although the processing gain
drops as D increases. Since a system with a larger number of carriers benefits more from diversity, the total utility increases
as the number of carriers increases.
We have also run simulations for the scenario in which the number of users and the number of carriers both increase but
their ratio and the processing gain per carrier stay fixed. In particular, we considered the cases of D = 1, 2, 4, and 8, with
N = 64 and K/D = 2. For each case, we ran the BMP algorithm for 20 000 channel realizations with MaxNumIter = 10D.
For each channel realization, if a stable state were reached at the end of the last iteration, we would count the number of users
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Fig. 11. Probability of having m users on the first carrier at Nash equilibrium, PX1(m), for the thirty-user, two-carrier case with processing gain equal to
128 (i.e., D = 2, K = 30 and N = 128).
on each carrier and record the values. While the results of the simulation are difficult to show graphically, we briefly describe
some of the observed trends. We saw from the simulation that as D increased, the probability that no Nash equilibrium existed
also increased. On the other hand, asymmetric Nash equilibria became less likely. This is because as D increases, the number
of users also increases but the processing gain stays the same. Therefore, larger transmit powers are required to achieve γ∗
for asymmetric cases. As a result, non-uniform Nash equilibria become less probable.
We now compare our proposed approach, which jointly maximizes each user’s utility over all the carriers, with the approach
that maximizes each user’s utility independently over each carrier. In the joint maximization approach each user transmits only
on the carrier that has the best effective channel whereas in the other case, all users transmit on all the carriers such that the
output SINR on each carrier is γ∗. We consider a system with two carriers and N = 128. We fix K and compute the sum of
the utilities achieved by all users for 20 000 channel realizations. The utility for each user is the ratio of the total number of
transmitted bits over the two carriers to the total energy consumed. Fig. 12 shows the average total utility vs. K for the two
approaches. We see a significant improvement in the achieved utility when joint maximization over all carriers is used. This is
because when all the users transmit on every carrier, they cause unnecessary interference. To achieve γ∗, each user is hence
forced to transmit at a higher power level which in turn results in a considerable reduction in the overall utility. In the joint
optimization approach, each user transmits only on its “best” carrier. This way, the users perform a distributed interference
avoidance mechanism which results in a higher overall utility.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have modeled power control for multi-carrier CDMA systems as a non-cooperative game in which each user needs to
decide how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its overall utility. The utility function has been defined
as the overall throughput divided by the total transmit power over all the carriers and has units of bits per Joule. This game
is particularly difficult to analyze because users’ strategies are vectors (rather than scalars) and the utility function is not a
quasiconcave function of the user’s strategy. For this utility function, we have shown that at a Nash equilibrium each user
transmits only on the carrier that has the best “effective channel” for that user. In addition, we have derived conditions for
existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and we have characterized the distribution of the users over the carriers at
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Fig. 12. Total utility vs. number of users, K , for the two-carrier case with processing gain equal to 128 (i.e., D = 2 and N = 128).
equilibrium. Basically, satisfaction of a set of inequalities by the relative channel gains of each user is sufficient for the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. We have also proposed an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium
(when it exists). We have shown that our proposed approach results in a significant improvement in the total network utility
achieved at equilibrium compared to a single-carrier system and also to a multi-carrier system in which users maximize their
utilities over each carrier independently.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF CONVERGENCE OF THE BMP ALGORITHM FOR THE TWO-USER TWO-CARRIER CASE
We prove that for the case of two users and two carriers, the BMP algorithm converges to an equilibrium whenever it
exists. For the sake of simplicity, here we assume a matched filter receiver. However, the proof can easily be generalized to
other linear receivers. Because of symmetry, we need only to consider two of the four possible Nash equilibria, namely, the
equilibrium in which both users transmit on the first carrier, denoted by (12, ), and the one in which user 1 transmits on the
first carrier and user 2 transmits on the second carrier, denoted by (1, 2).
A. The case in which (12, ) is the Nash equilibrium
In this case, we have h11
h12
> Θ2 and h21h22 > Θ2. The received powers at equilibrium are given by q
∗
11 = p
∗
11h11 = γ
∗σ2Θ2
and q∗21 = p∗21h21 = γ∗σ2Θ2.
1) Starting from (12, ): If user 1 (user 2) starts first and the received power for user 2 (user 1) is less than γ∗σ2Θ2,
user 1 (user 2) stays on the first carrier with its updated received power being less than γ∗σ2Θ2 but larger than that of user 2
(user 1). Since the received powers of both users are less than γ∗σ2Θ2, user 1 and user 2 both continue to stay on the first
carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
If the received powers are such that user 1 (user 2) jumps to the second carrier, then user 2 (user 1) stays on the first carrier
with its received power equal to γ∗σ2. Now, because h11
h12
> Θ2 (h21h22 > Θ2), user 1 (user 2) jumps back to the first carrier
with q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0 (q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0) which is less than γ∗σ2Θ2. From this point, both users stay on the first carrier and
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2) Starting from ( , 12): Since h11
h12
> Θ2 (h21h22 > Θ2), if user 1 (user 2) starts first, it will jump to carrier one with its
received power equal to γ∗σ2. Now, user 2 (user 1) jumps to carrier one with q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0 (q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0) which is less
than γ∗σ2Θ2. From this point, both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
3) Starting from (1, 2): If user 1 starts first, it will stay on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2. Then user 2 will jump on
first carrier with q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0. Therefore, as before, both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the
equilibrium is reached.
If user 2 starts first and stays on the second carrier, then we are back to the case that was just described. If user 2 jumps to
the first carrier and user 1 stays on the first carrier, then we are back to the case that was already explained in Section I-A.1.
On the other hand, if user 2 jumps to the first carrier and user 1 jumps to the second carrier, then user 2 will stay on the first
carrier with q21 = γ∗σ2. After this, user 1 jumps back to the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0. Thus, again, both users stay
on the first carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
4) Starting from (2, 1): The argument is similar to Section I-A.3 due to symmetry.
B. The case in which (1, 2) is the Nash equilibrium
Let us consider the case in which (1, 2) is the only Nash equilibrium. This corresponds to h11
h12
> Θ0 and h21h22 < Θ0 or
h11
h12
> 1/Θ0 and h21h22 < 1/Θ0. For this equilibrium, we have q
∗
11 = q
∗
22 = γ
∗σ2.
1) Starting from (12, ): If user 1 starts first and stays on the first carrier, then user 2 will jump to carrier two with
q22 = γ
∗σ2. As a result, user 1 will stay on the first carrier with q∗11 = γ∗σ2 and hence the equilibrium is reached.
If user 1 starts first but jumps on the second carrier, then because we are assuming that (1, 2) is the only Nash equilibrium
(i.e., h11
h12
> Θ0 and h21h22 < Θ0 or
h11
h12
> 1/Θ0 and h21h22 < 1/Θ0), user 2 will also jump on the second carrier. As a result, user 1
will jump back to carrier one with q∗11 = γ∗σ2 and user 2 will stay on carrier two with q∗22 = γ∗σ2. Hence, the equilibrium
is reached.
If user 2 starts first, it will jump on the second carrier with q22 = γ∗σ2. As a result, user 1 will stay on the first carrier
with q∗11 = γ∗σ2 and hence equilibrium is reached.
2) Starting from ( , 12): The argument is similar to Section I-B.1 due to symmetry.
3) Starting from (1, 2): If user 1 (user 2) starts first, it will stay on the first (second) carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2 (q22 = γ∗σ2).
As a result, user 1 (user 2) will stay on the first (second) carrier and hence equilibrium is reached.
4) Starting from (2, 1): If user 1 (user 2) starts first and jumps to the first (second) carrier, user 2 (user 1) will jump to
the second (first) carrier with q22 = γ∗σ2 (q11 = γ∗σ2). Thus, user 1 (user 2) will stay on the first (second) carrier and the
equilibrium is reached.
If user 1 (user 2) starts first but it stays on the second (first) carrier, then we will have q12 = γ∗σ2 (q21 = γ∗σ2). But because
we are assuming that (1, 2) is the only Nash equilibrium (i.e., h11
h12
> Θ0 and h21h22 < Θ0 or
h11
h12
> 1/Θ0 and h21h22 < 1/Θ0),
user 2 (user 1) jumps to carrier two (one) with q∗22 = γ∗σ2/Θ0 (q∗22 = γ∗σ2/Θ0). As a result, user 1 (user 2) jumps to the first
(second) carrier with q∗11 = γ∗σ2 (q∗22 = γ∗σ2). Thus, user 2 (user 1) will stay on the second (first) carrier and the equilibrium
is reached.
It can be seen from the above arguments that if (1, 2) and (2, 1) are both Nash equilibria, the algorithm converges to one
of them depending on the initial condition.
21
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF CONVERGENCE OF THE BMP ALGORITHM FOR THE TWO-USER D-CARRIER CASE
We prove the convergence of the BMP algorithm for the case of two users and three carriers. Generalization to the 2-user
D-carrier case is straightforward. In the 2-user 3-carrier case, there are 9 possible Nash equilibria. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume a matched filter receiver. However, the proof can easily be generalized to other linear receivers. Here, we focus on
the (12, , ) Nash equilibrium. An argument similar to the one given here and the ones used for the 2-user 2-carrier case
can be used for other equilibria.
A. The case in which (12, , ) is the Nash equilibrium
In this case, we have h11
h12
> Θ2,
h11
h13
> Θ2,
h21
h22
> Θ2 and h21h23 > Θ2. The received powers at equilibrium are given by
q∗11 = p
∗
11h11 = γ
∗σ2Θ2 and q∗21 = p∗21h21 = γ∗σ2Θ2.
1) Starting from (12, , ): If user 1 (user 2) starts first and the received power for user 2 (user 1) is less than γ∗σ2Θ2,
user 1 (user 2) stays on the first carrier with its updated received power being less than γ∗σ2Θ2 but larger than that of user 1
(user 2). Since the received powers of both users are less than γ∗σ2Θ2, user 1 and user 2 both continue to stay on the first
carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
If the received powers are such that user 1 (user 2) jumps to the second or third carrier, then user 2 (user 1) stays on the
first carrier with its received power equal to γ∗σ2. Now, because h11
h12
> Θ2,
h11
h13
> Θ2,
h21
h22
> Θ2 and h21h23 > Θ2, user 1
(user 2) jumps back to the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0 (q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0) which is less than γ∗σ2Θ2. From this point,
both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
2) Starting from ( , 12, ): Since h11
h12
> Θ2 (h21h22 > Θ2), if user 1 (user 2) starts first, it will jump to carrier one with its
received power equal to γ∗σ2. Now, user 2 (user 1) jumps to carrier one with q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0 (q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0) which is less
than γ∗σ2Θ2. From this point, both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
3) Starting from ( , , 12): The argument is similar to Section II-A.2 due to symmetry.
4) Starting from (1, 2, ): If user 1 starts first, it will stay on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2. Then user 2 will jump on
first carrier with q21 = γ∗σ2/Θ0. Therefore, as before, both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the
equilibrium is reached.
If user 2 starts first and stays on the second carrier, then we are back to the case that was just described. If user 2 jumps to
the third carrier, user 1 stays on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2. Then user 2 jumps to the first carrier and both users stay
there until equilibrium is reached.
If user 2 jumps to the first carrier and user 1 stays on the first carrier, then we are back to the case that was already explained
in Section II-A.1. On the other hand, if user 2 jumps to the first carrier and user 1 jumps to the second or third carrier, then
user 2 will stay on the first carrier with q21 = γ∗σ2. After this, user 1 jumps back to the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2/Θ0.
Thus, again, both users stay on the first carrier and update their powers until the equilibrium is reached.
5) Starting from (1, , 2): The argument is similar to Section II-A.4 due to symmetry.
6) Starting from (2, 1, ): The argument is similar to Section II-A.4 due to symmetry.
7) Starting from (2, , 1): The argument is similar to Section II-A.4 due to symmetry.
8) Starting from ( , 1, 2): If user 1 (user 2) starts first, it will jump to carrier one with q11 = γ∗σ2 (q21 = γ∗σ2). Then,
user 2 (user 1) jumps to the first carrier. Both user will then stay on the first carrier until equilibrium is reached.
9) Starting from ( , 2, 1): The argument is similar to Section II-A.8 due to symmetry.
22
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF CONVERGENCE OF THE BMP ALGORITHM FOR THE THREE-USER TWO-CARRIER CASE
We prove the convergence of the BMP algorithm for the case of three users and two carriers. In this case, there are 27
possible Nash equilibria. Here, we focus on the (123, ) and (12, 3) Nash equilibria. Similar arguments can be used for other
equilibria.
A. The case in which (123, ) is the Nash equilibrium
In this case, we have h11
h12
> Θ3,
h21
h22
> Θ3 and h31h32 > Θ3. The received powers at equilibrium are given by q
∗
11 = q
∗
21 =
q∗31 = γ
∗σ2Θ3. Here, we only discuss the convergence for two possible starting points. Similar arguments can be applied to
the other cases as well.
1) Starting from (123, ): If the powers are such that the three users stay on the first carrier, then they keep updating their
powers until they reach the equilibrium.
On the other hand, the powers can be such that one of the users jumps to the second carrier. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that user 3 jumps to the second carrier, i.e., let us assume that we have reached (12,3) and user 1 has to now
update its power.
• Now, if user 1 also jumps to the second carrier, user 2 stays on the first carrier with q21 = γ∗σ2. As a result, user 3
jumps back to carrier one with q31 = γ∗σ2/Θ0. Thus, user 1 also jumps to the first carrier and the users stay there until
the equilibrium is reached.
• Now let us assume that user 3 jumps but user 1 stays.
– If q21 ≤ γ∗σ2Θ3, then after user 1 updates its power, we will have q11 ≤ γ∗σ2Θ3. Therefore, user 1 and 2 both stay
on the first carrier and user 3 also jumps back to carrier one. The three users stay on this carrier until equilibrium is
reached.
– If q21 > γ∗σ2Θ3, then after user 1 updates its power, we will have q11 < q12. If user 2 stays, then user 1 will
also stay. In this case, the powers of users 1 and 2 decrease until user 3 jumps back to the first carrier. In this case,
q31 ≤ max{q11, q21}. One or two users may still jump to the second carrier but the powers of the users on the first
carrier keep decreasing. As a result, the users will eventually come back to the first carrier and at some point, the
powers become such that all three users stay on the first carrier until the equilibrium is reached. On the other hand,
if user 2 jumps to the second carrier and user 3 stays on the second carrier, then user 1 stays on the first carrier with
q11 ≤ γ
∗σ2. As a result, users 2 and 3 jump back to the first carrier and all three users stay there until an equilibrium
is reached. In the case where user 2 jumps on the second carrier but user 3 jumps back to the first carrier, we will
have q31 < q11. One or two may still continue to jump to the second carrier but the powers of the users on the first
carrier keep decreasing. Eventually, a point is reached where all three users come back to the first carrier and stay
there until the equilibrium is reached.
2) Starting from (1, 23): If user 1 starts first, it will stay on the first carrier. As a result, users 2 and 3 will also jump to
the first carrier and all three users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
Now, consider the case where user 2 starts first.
• If user 2 jumps on the first carrier and user 3 also jumps then we are back to the case that was discussed in Section III-A.1.
If user 2 jumps but user 3 stays on second carrier, then we are back to the (12,3) case discussed as part of Section III-A.1.
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• If user 2 stays on the second carrier and user 3 also stays, then user 1 will stay on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2.
As a result, users 2 and 3 will jump to the first carrier and all three users stay there until an equilibrium is reached. On
the other hand, if user 2 stays on the second carrier but user 3 jumps to the first carrier, then we will have the (13,2)
case. Although the users may still take turn in jumping to the second carrier, the powers of the users on the first carrier
keep decreasing. Eventually, a point is reached where all three users come back to the first carrier and stay there until
the equilibrium is reached. This is similar to the (12,3) scenario discussed as part of Section III-A.1.
Let us now consider the case in which user 3 starts first.
• If user 3 stays on the second carrier, then user 1 will stay on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2. As a result, users 2 and
3 will jump to the first carrier and all three users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
• If user 3 jumps to the first carrier, then we will be in the (13,2) case which is similar in nature to the he (12,3) scenario
discussed as part of Section III-A.1.
Similar arguments can be used for the remaining 25 starting points. It should be noted that symmetry can be used to reduce
the number of cases that need to be considered.
B. The case in which (12, 3) is the Nash equilibrium
Let us consider the case of h11
h12
> Θ2/Θ0,
h21
h22
> Θ2/Θ0 and h31h32 < Θ2/Θ0 for which (12,3) is the only equilibrium. Other
cases can be treated similarly. For the sake of brevity, we only discuss the (3,12) starting point. Similar arguments can be used
for other starting points.
1) Starting from (3, 12): Let us now consider the case in which user 1 starts first.
• If user 1 jumps to the first carrier and user 2 also jumps, then user 3 will jump to the second carrier with q32 = γ∗σ2.
Now, if either user 1 or user 2 jumps to the second carrier, user 3 still stays in the second carrier because h31
h32
< Θ2/Θ0.
Therefore, users 1 and 2 will eventually go back to the first carrier and stay there until the equilibrium is reached. On the
other hand, if user 1 jumps to the first carrier but user 2 stays on the second carrier, then user 3 will jump to the second
carrier with q32 = γ∗σ2/Θ0. As a result, user 1 stays on the first carrier with q11 = γ∗σ2 and user 2 also jumps to the
first carrier. They stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
• Now consider the case where user 1 stays on the second carrier and user 2 also stays.
– If user 3 jumps to the second carrier, then users 1 and 2 jump to the first carrier and user 3 will stay on the second
carrier. The users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
– If user 3 stays on the first carrier, then we will have q31 = γ∗σ2. As a result, users 1 and 2 jump to the first carrier
and then user 3 jumps to the second carrier. The users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
Let us now consider the case in which user 2 starts first.
• If user 2 stays on the second carrier and user 3 stays on the first carrier, then user 1 jumps on the first carrier with
q11 = γ
∗σ2/Θ0. As a result, user 2 also jumps to the first carrier and consequently user 3 jumps to the second carrier.
The users stay there until the equilibrium is reached. On the other hand, if user 2 stays on the second carrier and user 3
jumps to the second carrier, then users 1 and 2 will jump to the first carrier. As a result, user 3 stays on the second carrier.
Users 1 and 2 will stay on the first carrier until the equilibrium is reached.
• Now assume that user 2 jumps to the first carrier.
– If user 3 stays on the first carrier and user 1 jumps to the first carrier, then independent of whether user 2 jumps to
the second carrier, user 3 will jump to the second carrier. Because of this, users 1 and 2 will eventually jump to the
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first carrier and stay there until the equilibrium is reached. On the other hand, if user 3 stays on the first carrier and
user 1 stays on the second carrier, then by going through the two possibilities for user 2, it can be shown that user 3
will eventually jump to the second carrier and users 1 and 2 will jump to the first carrier. The users then stay there
until the equilibrium is reached.
– If user 3 jumps to the second carrier and user 1 stays on the second carrier, then user 2 will stay on the first carrier
with q21 = γ∗σ2. It can be shown by going through the two possibilities for user 3, that users 1 and 2 will eventually
end up on the first carrier and user 3 will end up on the second carrier. The users stay there until the equilibrium is
reached.
Let us now consider the case in which user 3 starts first. If user 3 stays on the first carrier, then users 1 and 2 will also jump
to the first carrier. As a result, user 3 will jump to the second carrier. The users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
On the other hand, if user 3 jumps to the second carrier, then users 1 and 2 will jump to the first carrier and user 3 will then
stay on the second carrier. The users stay there until the equilibrium is reached.
The convergence for other cases can be verified using similar arguments.
REFERENCES
[1] A. B. MacKenzie and S. B. Wicker, “Game theory in communications: Motivation, explanation, and application to power control,” Proceedings of the
IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference, pp. 821–826, San Antonio, TX, USA, Novermber 2001.
[2] D. J. Goodman and N. B. Mandayam, “Power control for wireless data,” IEEE Personal Communications, vol. 7, pp. 48–54, April 2000.
[3] H. Ji and C.-Y. Huang, “Non-cooperative uplink power control in cellular radio systems,” Wireless Networks, vol. 4, pp. 233–240, April 1998.
[4] C. U. Saraydar, N. B. Mandayam, and D. J. Goodman, “Efficient power control via pricing in wireless data networks,” IEEE Transactions on
Communications, vol. 50, pp. 291–303, February 2002.
[5] M. Xiao, N. B. Shroff, and E. K. P. Chong, “A utility-based power-control scheme in wireless cellular systems,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking,
vol. 11, pp. 210–221, April 2003.
[6] C. Zhou, P. Zhang, M. L. Honig, and S. Jordan, “Two-cell power allocation for downlink CDMA,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 3, pp. 2256–2266, November 2004.
[7] T. Alpcan, T. Basar, R. Srikant, and E. Altman, “CDMA uplink power control as a noncooperative game,” Wireless Networks, vol. 8, pp. 659–669,
November 2002.
[8] C. W. Sung and W. S. Wong, “A noncooperative power control game for multirate CDMA data networks,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 2, pp. 186–194, January 2003.
[9] F. Meshkati, H. V. Poor, S. C. Schwartz, and N. B. Mandayam, “An energy-efficient appraoch to power control and receiver design in wireless data
networks,” IEEE Transactions on Communications, vol. 53, November 2005.
[10] S. Hara and R. Prasad, “Overview of multicarrier CDMA,” IEEE Communications Magazine, pp. 126–133, December 1997.
[11] V. M. DaSilva and E. S. Sousa, “Performance of orthogonal CDMA codes for quasi-synchronous communication systems,” Proceedings of 2nd IEEE
International Conference on Universal Personal Communications, pp. 995–999, Ottawa, Canada, June 1993.
[12] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. Wiley, New York, 1991.
[13] S. Vishwanath, S. A. Jafar, and A. Goldsmith, “Adaptive resource allocation in composite fading channels,” Proceedings of the IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference, pp. 1312–1316, San Antonio, TX, USA, November 2001.
[14] G. Munz, S. Pfletschinger, and J. Speidel, “An efficient waterfilling algorithm for multiple access OFDM,” Proceedings of the IEEE Global
Telecommunications Conference, pp. 681–685, Taipei, Taiwan, November 2002.
[15] Z. Shen, J. G. Andrews, and B. L. Evans, “Optimal power allocation in multiuser OFDM systems,” Proceedings of the IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference, pp. 337–341, San Francisco, CA, USA, December 2003.
[16] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
[17] V. Rodriguez, “An analytical foundation for resource management in wireless communication,” Proceedings of the IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference, pp. 898–902, San Francisco, CA, USA, December 2003.
[18] W. Yu, G. Ginis, and J. M. Cioffi, “Distributed multiuser power control for digital subscriber lines,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 20, pp. 1105–1115, June 2002.
25
[19] R. Lupas and S. Verdu´, “Linear multiuser detectors for synchronous code-division multiple access channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 35, pp. 123–136, January 1989.
[20] U. Madhow and M. L. Honig, “MMSE interference suppression for direct-sequence spread-spectrum CDMA,” IEEE Transactions on Communications,
vol. 42, pp. 3178–3188, December 1994.
